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EFFECT OF EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. 278,
310 A.2d 426 (1973).
T HE PENNSYLVANIA SUPERIOR COURT, in Wiegand v. Wiegand,' struck
out at one of the true bastions of sex discrimination incorporated into
the Anglo-American legal system. The legislated discrimination of the
Pennsylvania Divorce Law was the object of the court's scrutiny. Appellee
Sara Wiegand had filed a complaint in divorce a mensa et thora,2 a
petition for alimony, and an initial petition for alimony pendente lite,
counsel fees, and expenses. On August 14, 1967, the Court of Common
Pleas, Allegheny County, ordered appellant Myron Wiegand to pay $875
per month alimony pendente lite and $250 preliminary counsel fees.
Subsequently, appellee filed additional petitions for counsel fees and costs
for continued or increased alimony pendente lite. Appellant submitted
answers to these pleadings and a counter-claim seeking divorce a vinculo
matrimoni.3 The court ordered appellant to pay $5,000 counsel fees and
$82.50 court costs. 4 On appeal to the Superior Court the husband limited
his assignment of errors to two related issues. The first was whether the
amount for counsel fees was excessive; the second whether the court below
erred in refusing to permit cross-examination of appellee as to how she
had dispersed the money previously paid over to her.5
Neither of these issues was given consideration by the Superior
Court in reaching its decision.6 Instead, the court sua sponte took
judicial notice of the conflict existing between those segments of the
1226 Pa. Super. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973).
2PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (1955) (A divorce from bed and board.) "A divorce
from bed and board is merely legal permission for a wife to live apart from her
husband while still remaining married without being guilty of desertion." Messarosh
v. Messarosh, 67 Lack. Jur. 29 (1966); Rutherford v. Rutherford, 152 Pa. Super. 517,
32 A.2d 921 (1943).
SPA. STAT. Arm. tit. 23, § 10 (1955) (A divorce from the bond of matrimony).
4 Wiegand v. Wiegand, C.P. Allegheny Cty., Family Div., No. 439 (Oct. 1967).
sAppellee had apparently received about $50,000 in alimony pendente lite from the
date of the initial order to March 10, 1972. She also admitted to having received
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Pennsylvania Divorce Law, upon which the wife's action was initiated,7
and the recently enacted Equality of Rights Amendment (ERA) of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.8 The court addressed itself specifically to
the constitutionality of sections 11 and 46 of the Pennsylvania Divorce
Law, which provide respectively that wives, but not husbands, may obtain
divorces from bed and board, and that wives may be permitted reasonable
alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, and costs in a divorce action. The
Superior Court reasoned that since sections 11 and 46 grant rights
exclusively to females, the rights of males in Pennsylvania are abridged
by these provisions solely on the basis of sex.9 Narrowing the impact
of its decision, the court concluded that legislation providing for divorce
from bed and board, or for counsel fees and alimony pendente lite would
be acceptable as long as such rights and remedies were made reciprocal.10
Although the majority concurred in the purpose espoused for the
Divorce Law providing alimony pendente lite and counsel fees, i.e., to
enable the wife to maintain her action either as the complainant or
defendant," it concluded that such a right could not be arbitrarily denied
to the husband on the sole factor of his sex.1- In reaching their conclusion,
the majority relied primarily upon the rationale expressed by the dissent
in the prior case of Henderson v. Henderson.13 The minority in Henderson
stated their position as follows:
Were such a reciprocal arrangement (as exists for support) established
7 These sections provide as follows: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (1955):
Upon complaint and due proof thereof, it shall be lawful for a wife to obtain a
divorce from bed and board whenever it shall be judged, in cases of divorce,
that her husband has: (a) Maliciously abandoned his family; or (b) Maliciously
turned her out of doors; or (c) By cruel and barbarous treatment endangered
her life; or (d) Offered such indignities to her person as to render her condition
intolerable and life burdensome; or (e) Committed adultery.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (1955) (in part): "In case of divorce from the bonds of
matrimony or bed and board, the court may, upon petition, in proper cases allow a
wife reasonable alimony pendente lite and reasonable counsel fees and expenses."
(Emphasis added.)
S PA. CONsT. art. I, § 27, which reads as follows: "Equality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the
sex of the individual."
9 Wiegand v. Wiegand, 310 A.2d 426, 428 (1973).
10 Id. See Commonwealth ex rel. Lukens v. Lukens, 224 Pa. Super. 227, 303 A.2d 522
(1973), in which the court sustained the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania support
laws since there existed a reciprocal arrangement for support.
U See Hendel v. Hendel, 109 P.L.J. 199 (1962); Wargo v. Wargo, 184 Pa. Super. 587,
136 A.2d 163 (1957); Albrecht v. Albrecht, 175 Pa. Super. 650, 107 A.2d 209, 210
(1954).
12 Wiegand v. Wiegand, 310 A.2d 426, 429 (1973); see also Corso v. Corso, 59 Pa.
D. & C. 2d 546, 120 P.L.J. 183 (1972); Kehl v. Kehl, 57 Pa. D. & C. 2d 164, 120
P.L.J. 296 (1972); Rogan v. Rogan, 63 Luz. L. Reg. 123 (C.P. 1973). Contra,
Henderson v. Henderson, 224 Pa. Super. 182, 303 A.2d 843 (1973) (per curiam);
Murphy v. Murphy, 224 Pa. Super. 460, 303 A.2d 838 (1973) (per curiam); Cooper
v. Cooper, 224 Pa. Super. 344, 307 A.2d 310 (1973) (per curiam); DeRosa v.
DeRosa, 60 Pa. D. & C. 2d 71 (1972); Frank v. Frank, 14 Lebanon 215 (C.P. 1973).
13 224 Pa. Super. 182, 303 A.2d 843 (1973).
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by section 46, allocating the responsibility to advance pendente lite
costs on the basis of need and ability, the Act would pass constitu-
tional muster.... It is precisely the unilateral benefit to women, but
not men, which violates the Equal Rights Amendment. 4
It is worthwhile to note at this juncture that section 47 of the
Pennsylvania Divorce Law additionally permits the award of permanent
alimony exclusively to the wife in a divorce from bed and board.15 The
Pennsylvania Divorce Laws make no comparable provision for the husband.
The rationale attached to granting the unilateral award of permanent
alimony in the case of a bed and board divorce (partial divorce), but not
for an absolute divorce, is significant. It is purported that the basis for
the distinction is that the husband's obligation to provide support for his
wife has not been terminated, since the bond of marriage remains intact
in a divorce from bed and board. 16 Such a rationale appears to be precipi-
tated from the established rule that the primary obligation to provide
financial support to the family rests upon the husband. 17 The legislatures
typically project this unilateral obligation into the area of divorce law. 8
In Davis v. Davis,19 for example, the Supreme Court of Alabama
expressed the general rule that in the absence of a statutory provision
there is no authority for awarding alimony against the wife in the
husband's favor.20 It seems certain that the adoption of an ERA would
obviate such a legislative or judicial presumption,21 for as long as the
principal obligation of support is laid upon the husband's shoulders, then
the requirement of "equality of rights under the law" has not been met.22
14 Id. 303 A.2d at 847.
15PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 47 (1955), provides in part: "In cases of divorce from
bed and board, the court may allow the wife such alimony as her husband's circum-
stances will admit of, but the same shall not exceed the third part of the annual profit
or income of his estate, or of his occupation and labor...."
16 See Commissioner v. Rankin, 270 F.2d 160 (3rd Cir. 1959); Appleton v. Appleton,
191 Pa. Super. 95, 155 A.2d 394 (1959).
17 See L. KAsowrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAw 69 (1st ed. 1969); Younger, Community
Property, Women and the Law School Curriculum, 48 N.Y.L.R. 211, 246 (1973).
18 For a collection of case law regarding the husband's right of alimony, see Annot.,
66 A.L.R. 2d 875 (1959); see also Davis v. Davis, 279 Ala. 643, 189 So. 2d 158
(1958); Kerr v. Kerr, 182 Cal. App. 2d 12, 5 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1960); Barnes v.
McKendry, 260 Cal. App. 2d 671, 67 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1968).
19 279 Ala. 643, 189 So. 2d 158 (1958).
20 Id. at 644, 189 So. 2d at 160.
21 See Behles, Equal Rights in Divorce and Separation, 3 N.M. REV. 118, 125 (1973);
THE CouNCIn. OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, ALL ARE CREATED EQUAL (Dec. 1972); See
also C. TAYLOR AND S. HEszoo, IMPACT STUDY OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
(2nd printing 1973).
22 See Comment, The Support Law and the Equal Rights Amendment in Pennsylvania,
77 DicK. L. REv. 254, 276 (1973), which suggests the use of the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act as a guide in revising the Pa. Divorce Laws in order to satisfy the
requirements of the ERA.
Fall, 1974]
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These antiquated and artificial assumptions by law 2 concerning the
roles and duties "naturally" befitting to women and men are not peculiar
to Pennsylvania. In reporting on their analysis of the New Mexico
Divorce Law, Jeannie and Daniel Behles concluded:
Clearly an Equal Rights Amendment would require that our laws
be changed to reflect the mutuality of obligation given lip service
in section 57-2-1 [New Mexico Statutes] by making each spouse
equally responsible for the support of the other, and by making
each one liable for alimony in appropriate cases.24
Although the holding in the principal case was a first for a
Pennsylvania Appellate Court, there existed support for this position in
the opinions rendered by a number of county courts.25 In Corso v.
Corso,26 for example, the majority therein ruled unconstitutional 23
Pennsylvania Statutes section 11, which limits the commencement of an
action for bed and board divorce to a wife. This same court found
unconstitutional 23 Pennsylvania Statutes section 46 in the case of
Kehl v. Kehl.2T The common factor in the above decisions was that
the particular sections of the Pennsylvania Divorce Law at issue
discriminated against the husband arbitrarily on the basis of sexual
stereotypes2 8 having no foundation in law.29
Excluding the recent flux of such cases in Pennsylvania, there exists
2 3 See Pokrandt v. Pokrandt, 67 Schuylkill L. Rec. 82 (1971), wherein the Court stated:
... a child of tender years should be committed to the care and custody of its
mother, by whom the needs of the child are ordinarily best served. One of the
strongest presumptions in our law is that a mother has a prima facie right to
her children over any other person [quoting from Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa.
Super. 210, 166 A.2d 60 (1960)]. These principles being established by logic
and history and confirmed by long repetition in the appellate courts are viewed
as fixed and settled law.
24Behles, supra n. 21, at 125. See THE CouNcu. OF STATE GOvER e mNTs, ALL ARE
CaATED EQuAL (Dec. 1972), containing its analysis of the proposed ERA to the
U.S. Constitution, in which it concluded: "The general rule or guiding principle
enunciated ... is that when the legislation restricts or limits the opportunities of a
sex, it would be invalidated; when the legislation confers a benefit or privilege [to
only one sex], such legislation would be extended to the opposite sex."
2 5 Corso v. Corso, 59 Pa. D. & C. 2d 546, 120 P.LJ. 183 (1972); Kehl v. Kehl, 57
Pa. D. & C. 2d 164, 120 P.L.J. 296 (1972); Rogan v. Rogan, 63 Luz. L. Reg. 123
(Pa. C.P. 1973). (This issue has not yet been reached by the bench of the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court.)
28 59 Pa. D. & C. 2d 546,120 P.L.J. 183 (1972).
27 57 Pa. D. & C. 2d 164, 120 P.L.J. 296 (1972).
28 See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN, S.
REP. No. 92-689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972): "This will mean [i.e. passage of the
ERA] that State domestic relations laws will have to be based on individual circum-
stances and needs, and not on sexual stereotypes."
29The rationale for the Corso and Kehl decisions was partially developed from an
article appearing in the Yale Law Journal: Brown, Emerson, Falk and Freedman,
The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women,
80 YALE LJ. 871, 889 (1971), submitting in part: "The basic principle of the Equal
Rights Amendment is that sex is not a permissible factor in determining the legal
rights of women, or of men."
[Vol. 8: 1
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a noticeable scarcity of judicial controversy on the validity of sex-based
distinctions in divorce laws. That case law which has emerged has been
supportive of the traditional, ingrained distinctions30 made between men
and women. An example is Barrington v. Barrington,n wherein the
majority ruled permissible the admitted discrimination drafted into
the Alabama Divorce Laws. The court explained that by giving the wife the
right of divorce in certain circumstances, and at the same time withholding
that right from the husband, the legislature was exercising a permissible
discretion "operating upon the moral, social, economical and physical
differences which distinguish the sexes and divide them into natural
classes."3 The majority believed that these factors have always justified
the various inequalities in legislative treatment, and therefore the statute
in question did not violate the appellant's fourteenth amendment rights.
Further attempts within the Federal Court structure to bring sex
discrimination into the purview of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment have generally, as in Barrington, proved to be
unsatisfactory.33 Unlike those of race, alienage, or national origin, classifi-
cations based on sex have failed to be designated by a consensus of the
Supreme Court" as "suspect." Strict scrutiny standards under the four-
teenth amendment have, therefore, not been applied to dissolve the strands
of a "double standard" legal system which confronts women and men daily.
Although a number of federal cases 5 have declared laws granting
benefits to one sex and not to the other unconstitutional, a serious
problem arises in that the courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, have performed inconsistently in their approach -to controversies
involving sexual discrimination. 36 In Stanley v. Illinois,8" the Supreme
30 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973), in which the Court stated:
"There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude
of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but
in a cage." For examples of "romantic paternalism," see Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464 (1948); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130
at 140-142 (1972).
31206 Ala. 192, 89 So. 512 (1921).
3Id. at 194, 89 So. at 514.
33For a collection of Supreme Court cases concerning sex discrimination see Annot.,
27 L. ED. 2d 935 (1971); see also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972);
Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
3 4 In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), four of the Justices (Brennan,
Douglas, White and Marshall) opinioned that classifications based on sex are inherently
suspect. However, the remaining members of the Court failed to concur in this position.
35See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see also United States ex rel. Robinson
v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); Karczewski v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 274
F. Supp. 169 (N.D. I. 1967).
36 Compare cases cited in note 33 supra, with those cited in note 35 supra.
3T405 U.S. 645 (1972),
Fall, 1974] R~cENrr CASES
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Court found constitutionally repugnant an Illinois law which made the
presumption that an unmarried father is unsuitable as a parent, thereby
allowing removal of his children from his custody without a hearing.
The Court stated:
... all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on
their fitness before their children are removed from their custody. It
follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley, and those like
him, while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably
contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.3 8
Confronted with reversed sex discrimination circumstances from
those in Stanley, the Supreme Court in Frontiero v. Richardson3 9 declared
violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment the difference
in treatment between servicewomen and servicemen under statutes govern-
ing the claiming of a spouse as a "dependent." Although the Court was
able to reach a consensus on the judgment, it split when it reached the
issue of whether or not sex was to be considered a "suspect classification." 40
By way of contrast, the Supreme Court, in a memorandum decision,
recently affirmed the ruling of a Federal District Court which upheld a
state law that required women to assume their husbands' surname upon
marriage. 41 The highest Court of the land has placed its stamp of approval
upon this instance of legislated discrimination without so much as an
opinion explaining its position, even though such a unilateral restriction
clearly tends to impinge upon the fundamental personal rights of a
married woman. Against this backdrop of inconsistency, it is little wonder
that the call for a national ERA has become so vocal.
Even with the inception of the ERA in Pennsylvania, the
Commonwealth Courts have in a few cases managed to avert what appears
to be an explicit mandate for sexual equality under the law. The most
comprehensive of these is DeRosa v. DeRosa.42 Again the issue before the
court was the constitutionality of 23 Pennsylvania Statutes section 46.
The majority upheld the constitutionality of this section on the basis
that the ERA alone does not nullify alimony pendente lite, counsel fees
or costs. According to the court, the legislature enacted the ERA with
full knowledge of the existing law relating to alimony pedente lite, but
made no provision to repeal the existing law. The court therefore
reasoned that such laws must be deemed valid.4 This position is wholly
38405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972). It should be noted that the Court did not label this as
a sex discrimination case.
39 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
40 1d. at 687. See note 34 supra.
41 Forbush v. Wallace, 405 U.S. 970 (1972), aff'g mem., 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D.
Ala. 1971).
42 60 Pa. D. & C. 2d 71 (1972).
43 Id. at 77, 78,
[Vol. 8:1
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unacceptable since under such a rationale the court would be denied
its power of judicial review.
In Frank v. Frank,44 the court, though confronted with the issue of
the constitutionality of 23 Pennsylvania Statutes section 11, did not decide
the case on that basis. Rather, the court upheld the validity of 23
Pennsylvania Statutes section 1 1 on the theory that the husband waived
his equal protection rights by reason of the contract of marriage.4 5 It
seems implausible that this reasoning could withstand strict scrutiny4 by
the higher courts. A "waiver" of one's rights under these circumstances
could scarcely be considered voluntary and made intentionally with
full knowledge of the consequences. 47
With the exception of DeRosa, and perhaps Frank, the remaining
cases" which have upheld the various sections of the Pennsylvania
Divorce Laws have summarily rejected the issue of constitutionality
without discussing the foundation of their position. In two of these
cases, however, Murphy v. Murphy 49 and Cooper v. Cooper,50 there
existed strong dissents supportive of the dissent in Henderson.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has rendered yet another
opinion construing the ERA, which would support the "mutuality of
rights" criteria of the Wiegand decision. In Hopkins v. Blanko,51 the
Superior Court considered the issue of whether Pennsylvania's refusal to
grant women the right to consortium 52 violated the Pennsylvania ERA.
44 14 Lebanon 215 (Pa. C.P. 1973).
45 Id. at 221, the court saying, in part:
Whenever, by oath, you gain the privileges of matrimony, you also accept the
legal obligations incident to it. As between spouses, an effective waiver of
the Equal Rights Amendment is accomplished by agreement. In this way the
traditional institution of marriage and the integrity of the family unit are
preserved. At the same time a citizen spouse enjoys the benefits of the Equal
Rights Amendment as against all other citizens and in all other legal matters
where sexual discrimination exists.
46 The following cases have dealt with the issue of sex as a "suspect classification"
requiring strict scrutiny: Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973); Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (by implication); United States ex rel Robinson v.
York, 281 F. Supp. 8, 14 (D. Conn. 1968); Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485
P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
4 7 See e.g. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957), wherein the Supreme Court held
that the waiver of right to counsel must be made "intelligently and understandingly"
to be effective.
48Cooper v. Cooper, 224 Pa. Super. 344, 307 A.2d 310 (1973); Henderson v.
Henderson, 224 Pa. Super. 182, 303 A.2d 843 (1973); Murphy v. Murphy, 224 Pa.
Super. 460, 303 A.2d 838 (1973). (All three of the preceding decisions were rendered
per curiam).
49 224 Pa. Super. 460, 303 A.2d 838 (1973).
50224 Pa. Super. 344, 307 A.2d 310 (1973).
51224 Pa. Super. 116, 302 A.2d 855 (1973).
52 Pennsylvania courts prior to this decision had refused to extend the right to
consortium to women. See Brown v. Glenside Lumber and Coal Co., 429 Pa. 601, 240
A.2d 822 (1968); Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960).
Fall, 19741
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The majority concluded that in order to achieve the constitutional
requirement of equal treatment for women and men, it must either
abolish the husband's right to consortium or extend this right to the
wife.53 Accordingly, the court found that since consortium was a valuable
right, it should not be extinguished but should be extended to the wife."
An assimilation of the foregoing case law indicates that the more
cogent constitutional reasoning rests with the rationale expounded by the
Wiegand majority. The time is long overdue for extending "equal
protection under law" to both sexes. In light of the Pennsylvania ERA,
there exists no rational basis for sanctioning legislation which impinges
upon fundamental personal rights on the sole basis of sex.
CONCLUSION
To date only 13 m states have enacted an ERA into their respective
state constitutions. Because of the recentness of their adoption, relatively
little case law has come forth which would indicate to the practitioner the
overall effect the ERA may have in his or her particular state.56 The
primary implication of the Wiegand decision is not the effect it is bound
to have on Pennsylvania Divorce Law, but the thrust it has given to the
direction of the ERA in Pennsylvania.57 If the Wiegand majority is
followed with any degree of consistency, it appears that Pennsylvania's
ERA, unlike the fourteenth amendment, will provide a potent mechanism
for extinguishing discrimination based on sex.
53 302 A.2d at 857 (1973); accord, Karczewski v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 274 F. Supp.
169 (1967).
54 302 A.2d at 858 (1973). See also THE COUNSEL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, ALL ARE
CRATED EQUAL (Dec. 1972).
55 ALASKA CoNsT. art. I, § 3; COLO. CoNsT. art. II, § 29; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 4;
ILL. CoNsT. art. I, § 18; MD. CONST. art. 46; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; N.M.
CONsT. art. II, § 18; PA. CONsT. art. I, § 27; TEx. CONSr. art. I, § 3a; UTAH CONST.
art. IV, § 1; VA. CoNsT. art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1; WYo. CONST. art.
VI, § 1.
SThose cases rendered pursuant to a question of constitutionality under an adopted
Equal Rights Amendment, include in part: People v. Green, 514 P.2d 769 (Cal.
Super Ct. 1973); Maryland Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 370 Md. 496, 312
A.2d 216 (1973); Slavis v. Slavis, 12 Ill. App. 3d 467, 299 N.E.2d 413 (1973);
People v. Ellis, 10 I1. App. 3d 216, 293 N.E.2d 189 (1973); Scanlon v. Crim, 500
S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1973); and Minner v. Minner, 19 Md. App. 154, 310
A.2d 208 (1973), in which the court, confronted with the identical issue that faced
the Wiegand Court, avoided the constitutional question by determining that the
appellant lacked standing.
57 For predictions on the effect upon the legal relationships of women and men as a
result of an ERA, see generally Behles, supra n. 21; Brown, et. al., supra n. 29;
Dorsen and Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional Amendment, 6 HAIv. Clv.
RIGHTS-Cv. Lm. L. REV. 216 (1971); Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendment:
Some Problems of Construction, 6 HAnv. Civ. RGHTs--CIv. Lm. L. REV. 243 (1971).
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The ERA to the United States Constitution 58 has not yet been
ratified by the required number of state legislatures to permit its
adoption.5 9 However, the Wiegand decision indicates that once adopted,
the Federal ERA will accelerate the long overdue changes necessary to
eliminate the areas of existing sexual discrimination affecting female and
male alike. Simply put, the ERA, once enacted, will force the federal
courts to accomplish what was required, but neglected, under the
fourteenth amendment.
JOSEPH M. DONLEY
58 The proposed ERA to the United States Constitution reads as follows: "Section 1.
Equality of rights under law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
any state on account of sex. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." H.RJ. REs. 208, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971); S.J. REs. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
59 To become part of the Constitution, the ERA must be ratified by 38 states within
seven years after congressional approval. To date, 33 states have ratified it. (On
Mar. 15, 1973, the Nebraska Legislature voted to rescind its ratification of the ERA.
However, the legality of a recission of a constitutional amendment remains in question.)
Fall, 19741
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